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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

OF

FloridaDairy FarmersFed'n v. Borden Co., 155 So. 2d 699 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1963)
Florida Dairy Farmers Federation, an agricultural marketing cooperative association, brought an action to enjoin Borden Company
and other dairy distributors from marketing certain dairy products.
The Federation claimed that these products, which were made by
combining powdered milk with water, cream, and syrup, constituted
reconstructed milk in violation of Florida Statutes. 1 Respondents
based their defense on an interpretation of the Milk Commission that
this process was not in violation of statutory prohibition. The First
District Court of Appeal declined to follow the agency's interpretation, and HELD, that the statute is intended to prohibit reconstruction of milk by adding water to milk products, thus distributors were
violating the statute by marketing these products.
The court recognized that the administrative interpretation was of
long standing and, although not binding, was to be accorded great
weight. The court said, however, that it should not follow the agency
interpretation when it is repugnant to the clear intent of the statute.
The court did not go into the factual determinations made by the
Milk Commission nor mention the agency's basis for its decision.
There is a valid distinction between statutory interpretation and
administrative fact finding with subsequent application to statutory
criteria.2 As a necessary function of their operations, administrative
agencies construe and apply statutes within their area of expertise.
Administrative interpretation provides a practical method for agency
application of the law and is an experienced judgment to which
courts will often turn for guidance. 3 Gray v. Powell4 is the leading
case establishing the rule that courts, when reviewing an administrative application of a statutory term to undisputed facts, should affirm
an agency's determination if it has a reasonable basis, rather than
exercise independent judgment. This rule was supported in NLRB

1. "It is unlawful to sell recombined or reconstructed milk in the state." FLA.
STAT. §502.01 (1963).

2. Problems involved in judicial review of issues of law are further developed
in Note, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 86 (1949).
3. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
4. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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v. Hearst Publications5 when the United States Supreme Court, although recognizing the reviewing court's power to interpret statutes
when arising in the first instance, stated that the court should recognize a limitation on its function when the agency has initially determined the application of a broad statutory term. The court in
Florida Dairy Farmers does not indicate that the expertise or initial
decision by the agency had any effect on its interpretation of the
statute. In NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co.6 the Supreme Court
recognized its right to review a decision of the N.L.R.B. that determined that agency's jurisdiction to issue a collective bargaining
order. In his dissent Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized that the best
source for determining the proper definition of a statutory term is the
body to which the administration of the statute has been committed
by the legislature.7 Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in the same
case, recognized the need to rely on an agency's expertise and said that
the test was "not whether the construction would be our own if we
sat as the Board, but whether it has a reasonable basis in custom,
practice, or legislative history."8
Although the power to interpret a statute has long been recognized
as vested in the courts,9 proper judicial use of administrative expertise
and reliance upon an administrative interpretation of long standing
does not divest the courts of this power. 10 Courts have frequently
deferred to an agency interpretation when it has been followed by
industry and has fulfilled society's needs.- The force of an interpretation of long standing is increased by the fact that the legislature
has impliedly condoned it by not changing the statute.1 2 The court
in Florida Dairy Farmers did not go into the reasons for reversing
the agency's interpretation and did not mention the agency's justification for its ruling. The inclusion of such information would at
least give a basis for inferring why the court disagreed. The court
did say, however, that the interpretation was contrary to the clear intent of the statute.

5. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
6. 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
7. 341 U.S. at 327.
8. 341 U.S. at 327-28.
9. NLRB v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra note 5; Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433
(1921).
10. Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836).
11. Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Bowen v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 19 (1939); State ex rel. Fronton Exhibition Co. v. Stein, 144 Fla. 387,
198 So. 82 (1940); State ex rel. Franklin County v. Lee, 137 Fla. 658, 188 So.
775 (1939).
12. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 152 Fla. 55, 10 So.
2d 793 (1942).
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The term "clear intent" has been used by Florida courts on
several occasions, 1 but the meaning of "clear intent" remains a perplexing problem. Legislative history and the rules and canons of
legislative interpretation are directed toward the discovery of intent,
but, in the final analysis, it is apparent that the intent ascribed to a
given statute is that of the court. The question whether statutory
interpretation by an agency is in conflict with clear intent is, in each
14
case, addressed to the judges, and frequently they disagree.
What leads a court to determine that the clear intent is contrary
to the agency's interpretation? It is a well recognized rule that a
question of fact or application of a statute is within the scope of the
agency's power, while a question of law or interpretation is within
the power of the court.1 5 The difficulty in this law-fact dichotomy is
that there is no question of fact that cannot be labeled a question of
law in order to provide review. If the issue is clearly within the
realm of fact, it is nevertheless a simple matter for a court to say that
it is merely safeguarding due process,' 6 or is determining whether the
supporting evidence is material 7 and thereby circumvent the established division of jurisdiction. Florida courts have held the door
open for review by saying that it is judicial duty to determine the
status of the law,' 8 and they have similarly closed the door by saying
that administrative construction should not be overturned unless
clearly erroneous, and then only for the most cogent reasons. 9 Professor Davis in his text on administrative law20 suggests that judicial
review depends on such factors as the judge's confidence in the

13. Southeastern Utilities Serv. Co. v. Redding, 131 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1961); Bill
Frey, Inc. v. State ex rel. Taylor, 127 Fla. 671, 173 So. 812 (1937); Ex parte Perry, 71
Fla. 250, 71 So. 174 (1916).
14. E.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). It was dear
to the majority that legislative intent was to include foremen in the term "employees." It was equally clear to the minority, however, that foremen were not
included.
15. Flemming v. Mohawk Wrecking Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947); United States
Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
16. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.
v. Delta Motor Line, Inc., 218 Miss. 198, 67 So. 2d 252 (1953); State ex rel. Pudget
Sound Nay. Co. v. Department of Transp., 33 Wash. 2d 448, 206 P.2d 456 (1949).
17. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Louisville & N.R.R. v. United
States, 238 U.S. 1 (1915).
18. Green v. Hood, 120 So. 2d 223 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Green v. Wisner,
119 So. 2d 814 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); L. B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Gay, 44 So.
2d 87 (Fla. 1950); Marion Mortgage Co. v. State ex rel. Davis, 107 Fla. 472, 145

So. 222 (1932).
19. Green v. Stuckey's, Inc., 99 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1957); King v. Seamon, 59
So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1952); Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 59 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1952).
20. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §30.08 (1959).
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agency's judgment, his feelings toward the cause involved, the character of the agency, the nature of the problems with which it deals, and
public sentiment toward the agency. That which will influence,
therefore, depends more upon which factors guide judicial discretion
than upon judicial fidelity to a verbal formula. Florida courts, by the
use of such verbal formulas, have created a twilight zone of reviewability. Too often hidden policy factors cause an artificial distinction where the court chooses to place it.
When the administrative interpretation has been in effect for a
period of time, with implied legislative approval, the courts ought
to be extremely hesitant to overrule the interpretation. If the courts
do review, they should not feel inhibited in expressing the relevant
underlying factors, but should avoid a summary handling of these
cases in order to eliminate misunderstanding. It is suggested that
the court in Florida Dairy Farmerscould have contributed to a better
understanding of the nature of judicial review in cases involving
administrative interpretation of statutory provisions had it discussed:
(1) the reasons behind the agency's interpretation, (2) the reasons
for the court's disagreement, (3) the proper function of the agency in
interpretation and construction of statutes, and (4) the legislative
intent behind enactment of the statute. The Florida Legislature might
further define the effect of an administrative agency's act of statutory
interpretation and, in so doing, limit the effects of subjective factors
in the process of judicial review. This problem, however, can best be
solved by judicial adoption of a well defined, uniform policy of
review.
JAMEs A. GARLAND
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